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Turnbull on Garthoff, 'Soviet Leaders and Intelligence:
Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War'
Review published on Sunday, December 11, 2016
Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during
the Cold War. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015. 160 pp. $26.95 (paper), ISBN
978-1-62616-229-7; $49.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-62616-228-0.
Reviewed by Brian Turnbull (University of Kansas) Published on H-War (December, 2016)
Commissioned by Margaret Sankey
Raymond L. Garthoff sets out in this book to provide needed insight into the role intelligence played
in Soviet leaders’ decision making toward the United States throughout the Cold War. As a former
ambassador to Bulgaria and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, he is in a unique position to do
so. His experience comes through with interesting anecdotal accounts of conversations with his
Soviet counterparts, but does not form the empirical core of this work. The primary research for this
book comes from intelligence and Cold War literature in both Russian and English. Many of the
English works will be familiar to students of intelligence or national security studies. As a student of
this literature myself, I have already read similar arguments and conclusions in other scholarship.
Contrary to what the reader may initially expect from the title, intelligence played a minor role in
influencing the perspectives and decisions of top Soviet leaders, and when intel did manage to gain
an ear it was often counterproductive and even dangerous. Many factors created an environment
where leadership disregarded or totally ignored the intel produced—a political environment that
rejected or even punished views counter to the status quo, perspectives dominated by Soviet
ideology, a focus on “active measures” and operations at the expense of analysis within the
intelligence apparatus, and attempts by intelligence leaders to influence the political situation by
modifying or suppressing intel.
Garthoff takes a strategic perspective by focusing exclusively on the four primary general/first
secretaries of the Soviet Union: Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and
Mikhail Gorbachev. A chapter is dedicated to each, with a chronological walk-through of how each
leader’s perspective shifted over time and how this shift altered the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the United States. This approach lends a “Great Man” flavor to his argument that is
further reinforced by the apparent lack of any real influence on their own decision making outside of
their personal interpretation of events and first-hand experience with US leaders. While it is
well established that general secretaries had an enormous, relatively unconstrained personal
influence on Cold War relations between the two superpowers, the lack of any real analytical attempt
to go beyond explaining this relationship in terms of the men involved takes this book down welltrodden avenues. The reader finishes the book wanting more explanation, particularly of the causal
connection between the personal experiences of the Soviet leaders and the formation and
modification of their perspectives. Garthoff takes us through the adaptation of perspectives to
contemporary events, but we have to take his opinion for granted. More empirical support for these
connections would have been enormously beneficial and would have provided valuable new
information for the field. Admittedly, such information may be impossible to obtain. Garthoff couches
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many of his assertions in the biographies of these leaders, which may be the best available sources,
but in turn this reliance relegates these aspects of the book to more of an analytical literature review.
The historical walk-through approach results in the large majority of the book being dedicated to a
straightforward historical progression of Soviet leadership, leaving little room for actually
establishing the role of intelligence. Again this likely stems from the lack of real influence intelligence
had in top leadership circles, but I finished the book still not having a detailed understanding of the
relationship between Soviet leadership and the intelligence community. Garthoff does provide some
nuggets, particularly with regard to the interaction between the KGB chairman Yuri Andropov and
Brezhnev, which are interesting, but the work would have benefited from a greater focus on the
intelligence apparatus. Instead, the near exclusive focus on leadership brings the analysis around to
the intel world only on the rare occasion Soviet leadership interacted with the KGB or GRU (Glavnoye
razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye, or Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces), interactions that appear to have had no real effect. Garthoff does provide some insight into
the counterproductive role played on occasion by the intelligence community, such as the continual
exaggeration of American capabilities and threat, and even false alarms on impending nuclear
attacks, which ironically may have been the most influence the intelligence apparatus ever had on
decision making.
The main conclusions that are drawn from this book are the surprising lack of good intel available to
both Soviet and American leadership. Garthoff does provide a thorough account of the many failings
by intel agencies on both sides to keep their leaders well informed on the adversary. He spends much
less time discussing the American intelligence community, but the information he does offer may run
counter to the initial understanding of many with regard to US intel capabilities during the Cold War.
Finally, the most useful and novel conclusion presented by this book is his discussion of the early shift
in Soviet thinking across much of its leadership to the pursuit of a relatively peaceful coexistence
with the United States. My own understanding put the earliest real shift toward a less aggressive
stance vis-à-vis the United States during the Brezhnev détente era, but Garthoff illustrates a
substantial change in thinking as far back as Khrushchev. Furthermore, attempts by Soviet leaders to
shift toward a more peaceful relationship were often thrown off track by aggressive posturing by
American administrations, another facet that is often glossed over in the American intelligence
literature. These conclusions are well supported and provide what appears to be Garthoff’s main
theme in this work. In fact, the reader would be better prepared if “intelligence” was left out of the
title entirely, and the focus left on the Soviet leadership’s assessment of the American adversary.
Regardless, Garthoff provides a thorough description of key events within the Cold War and the
influence of Soviet leadership on the progression of the USSR-US relationship in a concisely worded
book that would be useful for those without a great deal of experience in intelligence or Cold War
literature. For those better versed, many of the arguments in this work will be familiar, but the
discussion of the genuine effort on the part of Soviet leadership in the pursuit of more peaceful
relations between the two superpowers may be both novel and valuable.
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